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Subnational institutional environments, political capital, and the 
internationalization of entrepreneurial firms in emerging economies 
 
Abstract 
This study advances the institution-based view of strategy by integrating it with firm-
specific capability considerations. In particular, we investigate the integrative influence of 
subnational-level home country institutional environments and firm-level political capital, 
as an important way to seek resources, on emerging economy entrepreneurial firms’ 
internationalization. With data from Chinese entrepreneurial firms, we find that the 
development of subnational institutional environments in the home country is related to 
firms’ degree of internationalization. Furthermore, while political capital with low-level 
governments enhances the effect of subnational institutions on internationalization, 
political capital with high levels of government has no such moderation effect. Theoretical 
and empirical contributions and implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
How do environmental factors affect entrepreneurial firms’ internationalization strategies? 
Grounded in the industry-based view and an emerging institution-based view, extant 
research has investigated the influence of host country environments on firm 
internationalization in a range of settings (e.g., Ahlstrom, Levitas, Hitt, Dacin, & Zhu, 2014; 
Dikova, Jaklič, Burger, & Kunčič, 2016; Hitt, Li, & Xu, 2016). Other recent work shows 
how home country environments, in particular country-level institutional environments, 
exert important influences on firms’ actions regarding internationalization and performance 
(Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Yamakawa, Peng, & 
Deeds, 2008). However, little is known about the influence of subnational institutions in 
the home country on firms’ internationalization strategies. This gap is important because 
there is an uneven distribution of institutional development across subnational regions in 
many countries, including large emerging countries (Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2010a). In 
addition, other differentiating factors, such as different subcultures and dialects, exist 
(Gong, Chow, & Ahlstrom, 2011; Redfern & Crawford, 2010). Relatedly, the strategic 
management and international business literature streams have shed increasing light on the 
effects of subnational regions on firm performance (Chan et al., 2010a; Ma, Tong, & Fitza, 
2013). Thus, the main purpose of this study is to join these research streams by examining 
how the within-home-country variations of institutions influence firms’ 
internationalization strategies. 
This study focuses on the internationalization strategies of emerging economy 
entrepreneurial firms. In particular, we argue that (1) well-established subnational 
institutional environments in emerging economies can have a positive effect on 
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entrepreneurial firms’ internationalization and (2) such an effect is contingent on individual 
firms’ resource-seeking strategies. We investigate the role of entrepreneurial firms’ political 
capital, with both high- and low-level governments in the home country (Ahlstrom, Bruton 
& Lui, 2000; Lu & Ma, 2008), as an important resource-seeking strategy. The 
differentiation of political capital is consistent with recent research showing that firms must 
deploy the network in a cohesive and coordinated way to facilitate globalization strategies 
(Hatani & McGaughey, 2013).  
This study tests the hypotheses using biennial-surveyed longitudinal data of a sample 
of 760 Chinese entrepreneurial firms from 2002 to 2006. The substantive variation of 
within-country institutional environments, the critical role of the Chinese government in 
economic activities, the active deployment of political capital, and the increasing number 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) from China all provide an appropriate empirical 
context to test the research model proposed in this study. 
The study makes several contributions to international business research and practice. 
First, we offer evidence of the importance of a firm’s geography for its strategic choice, 
particularly identifying the impact of subnational institutions. Our study is consistent with 
a growing stream of research that explicitly recognizes the strategic role and implication 
of MNCs’ home country geographic location (Sölvell, 2015; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; 
Yamakawa et al., 2008). This article aims to extend that work by demonstrating the 
presence and importance of subnational institutions and their impact on shaping the 
internationalization strategy of entrepreneurial firms embedded within the context. One 
contribution of this study therefore lies in integrating the international business literature 
with subnational geography studies.  
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Second, this study contributes to theory by extending the institution-based view of 
strategy (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009) to examine the interactive effect of 
subnational institution with firm-level strategy. Rather than treating firms as passive 
recipients of benefits from strong (and uniform) institutions, we view them as active 
participants trying to exploit advantages from their varied institutional environments in 
their home country. 1  Research has long argued that political capital facilitates the 
performance of firms in various ways (e.g., Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008; Dunbar & 
Ahlstrom, 1995; Peng & Health, 1996). Firms try to deploy different types of political 
capital to effectively gain resources from home country institutional environments 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2000). Specifically, we differentiate between political capital with high 
and low levels of government; indeed, high and low levels of government differ greatly in 
organizational size, responsibility, authority, and efficiency (Chan et al., 2010a; Higgins, 
Young, & Levy, 2009; Li, He, Lam, & Yiu, 2012; Meyer & Peng, 2005). Therefore, we 
argue that different levels of political capital and their effects matter. In particular, we 
contend that deployment of political capital with high-level governments aids 
entrepreneurial firms in securing resources from their institutional environments by 
enhancing their credibility and legitimacy (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). Conversely, deployment 
of political capital with low-level governments enhances firms’ resource-seeking capability 
by providing key institutional information. Thus, we offer a framework that accounts for 
both institutions in the home country and entrepreneurial firms’ resource-seeking strategy. 
Finally, studies in strategic management limit the effects of political capital to the 
                                                             
1 Institutions are considered strong if they support the voluntary exchange underpinning 
an effective market mechanism (Meyer et al., 2009). 
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strategic behavior in firms’ domestic market, thus largely ignoring their effects in 
international markets (Faccio, 2010; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Wu, 2011; You 
& Du, 2012). Given the limited international experience of emerging economy–based 
entrepreneurial firms, this article provides insights into how and to what extent they utilize 
political capital across borders, leading to a better understanding of their international 
strategies (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006).  
 
2. Theoretical overview  
2.1. An institution-based view of internationalization 
Institutions are commonly recognized rules, both formal (e.g., regulations, laws) and 
informal (e.g., codes of conduct, norms), in a society (North, 1990). Scott (2013) defines 
institutions as the regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behavior. Regulative or legal aspects of institutions most 
commonly take the form of formal institutions—they guide organizational action by force 
or threat of legal sanctions—while normative and cognitive institutions generally take the 
form of informal institutions—they guide organizational actions stemming from social, 
professional, and cognitive-cultural aspects (Chao & Kumar, 2010; Scott, 2013). In this 
sense, institutions structure the economic, political, and social relationships in a society or 
country and thus determine the transaction and transformation costs of firms embedded 
within them (Chan et al., 2010a). Therefore, by treating institutions as independent 
variables, the institution-based view defines firms’ strategic choices and performance as 
the outcome of the economic, political, and social institutions they confront (Meyer et al., 
2009; Peng, Wang, & Yi, 2008; Yamakawa et al., 2008).  
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Scholars have documented the growing importance of formal and informal institutions 
as both constraints and facilitators to strategy across borders (Doh, Luthans, & Slocum, 
2016). Propelled by research on emerging economies, an institution-based view has been 
influential in the study of internationalization (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; 
Meyer et al., 2009; Yamakawa et al., 2008) and increasingly in entrepreneurship (Bruton, 
Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010). This is because emerging and developed economies can vary 
significantly in terms of institutional frameworks (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2013; Ahlstrom, Young, Nair, & Law, 2003). Compared with developed 
countries, emerging countries are typically characterized by poorer governance and weaker 
and less efficient formal institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; De Soto, 1989). 
These profound differences in institutional frameworks have led scholars to pay more 
attention to how the institutional environment shapes MNCs’ internationalization strategies 
and performance. For example, recent studies on institutional distance have found that 
distances on the regulative, normative, and cognitive dimensions of institutions between 
the host and home countries affect MNCs’ strategies pertaining to host country selection, 
entry mode, and performance (e.g., Chao & Kumar, 2010; Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011; 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Another stream of research focusing on the home country 
institutional environment documents that the level of institutional development in the home 
country may affect firms’ tendency to internationalize as well as their performance in 
internationalization (e.g., Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Yamakawa et al., 2008). These two 
streams of literature agree that national-level institutional environments of either the home 
or host countries shape MNCs’ internationalization strategies and performance.  
Studies have also shown that an additional class of institutional environmental factors, 
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that is, subnational institutions in home countries, has a statistically significant impact on 
a foreign subsidiary’s choice of entry strategy and performance (e.g., Chan et al., 2010a; 
Ma et al., 2013; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). Arguably, a subnational level allows for a more 
fine-grained analysis of regional differences, given that subnational regions in an emerging 
country can differ remarkably in the level of institutional development (Ma et al., 2013; 
Zhou, Delios, & Yang, 2002). Despite significant findings, this stream of studies has two 
limitations. First, little is still known about the role of home country subnational institutions 
in firms’ internationalization strategy making. Second, in viewing firms as the recipients 
of the benefits of strong institutions, these studies largely ignore how firms proactively 
exploit the institutions, in particular the subnational institutions, to gain advantages over 
competitors under the same institutional environment. We elaborate on this missing link in 
the institution-based view of internationalization next.    
2.2. The missing link: Both understanding and utilizing institutions  
A well-developed subnational institutional environment may provide opportunities for 
entrepreneurial firms to gain access to various resources and knowledge related to 
internationalization, but the achievement of such resources involves a process of exploiting 
the advantage of institutions. This implies that firms are not merely passive recipients of 
institutional advantages; rather, they proactively adapt their strategies to develop 
knowledge and capacity to exploit home country institutions and, thus, to enjoy more 
exploitation benefits from the institutional context (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992). In particular, the literature emphasizes two requirements for the 
exploitation of institutional advantages: having broad knowledge of institutions and the 
capability of utilizing these institutions.  
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First, MNCs must have a general awareness of the various institutions, their features, 
and their usefulness. Well-established institutional environments reduce transaction costs 
and increase transaction efficiency, thus facilitating firm transactions. However, the extent 
to which institutions facilitate transactions depends on the level of firms’ knowledge of the 
institutions. The more familiar they are, the better they can exploit the institutions to 
facilitate transactions.  
For example, well-developed institutional environments contain many intermediaries, 
such as credit-rating agencies, investment analysts, merchant bankers, venture capital firms, 
search and recruiting agencies, and marketing research and advertising companies, through 
which entrepreneurial firms can gain access to various resources in product, labor, and 
capital markets (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005). Thus, firms need to identify potential 
intermediaries through which they can gain resources more effectively and learn to assess 
and cooperate with potential intermediaries (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Rubanik, 2011), 
both of which increase the search, negotiation, and contracting costs of firms. The lack of 
knowledge of institutional environments thus magnifies transaction costs (Henisz & Delios, 
2002; Meyer, 2001; Oxley, 1999).  
Empirical studies also provide empirical support for the importance of understanding 
institutional environments. For example, Henisz and Delios (2001) find that Japanese 
MNCs tend to eschew politically hazardous countries, with the effect strongest for firms 
without experience in the host country and without experience gathered from international 
investments in other countries. These results underscore the importance of both the 
institutional environment and firm-specific capability as determinants of entry. Indeed, 
although understanding the institutional environment is a necessary condition for firms to 
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gain access to institutional benefits, it is not sufficient (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Puky, 2009). 
The second requirement is that firms must have the capability of exploiting and 
utilizing the opportunities the institutional environment offers. When an institutional 
environment is not well-established, firms may need to rely more on network- or relation-
based strategies to develop the ability to fill the institutional voids. For example, Khanna 
and Palepu (2000) find that at higher levels, industry diversification of Indian business 
groups is positively related to affiliated firms’ performance, because a diversification 
strategy can help fill institutional voids in emerging economies.  
The capability of exploiting institutional benefits is also important in a well-developed 
institutional context. In strong institutional environments, firms can face information 
asymmetries (Arrow, 1971; Buckley & Casson, 1998), asset specificity (Williamson, 1985), 
or costly transfer of tacit knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Teece, 1977), which requires 
them to develop capabilities to enhance competitiveness and manage the environments. 
The lack of capabilities in this way magnifies transaction costs. For example, Peng and 
Hao (2011) confirm that firms that enter developed countries but ignore foreign institutions 
may lose legitimacy in the face of an international crisis or even low-level conflict. 
In summary, the integration of the institution-based view with institution exploitation 
capability can better predict how the institutional environment shapes MNCs’ 
internationalization behavior and consequent performance. The institution-based view 
speaks to MNCs’ location advantages insofar as institutions are most conducive to their 
business operations. However, these advantages might not materialize if firms lack the 
relevant capability of recognizing institutional variation (Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang, 
2009) and proactively managing the institutional environment and institutional differences, 
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particularly at the local and regional levels (Ahlstrom et al., 2003; Peng et al., 2009; Poncet, 
2005).     
 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. Home country subnational institutions 
Institutions are commonly understood as the formal and informal “rules of the game 
in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3). Consistent with the institution-based view, prior studies 
have found that a country’s institutional environment partially shapes firms’ strategies (Hitt, 
Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004) and approaches to internationalization and 
product diversification (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004; Peng et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008; 
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).  
With many countries’ gradual shift from centrally planned to market-based economies 
in recent years (Peng & Heath, 1996), large subnational regional differences have emerged 
in the level of their institutional development (Chan et al., 2010a; Chan, Lin, & Wong, 
2010b; Li et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2013). Complementing studies that emphasize the country-
level institutional environment, a limited stream of literature shows that the subnational 
institutional environment in a host country matters for the performance of MNCs (Ma et 
al., 2013; McGahan & Victer, 2010; Poncet, 2005). Subnational regions in a country vary 
in aspects such as economic, political and legal, and social institutions, which govern 
business transactions and thus affect the strategy and performance of firms embedded 
within the local context (Meyer et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008).  
Wan and Hoskisson (2003) find that the factors and institutions in the home country 
also differ, representing diverse sets of opportunities and constraints for firms, and thus 
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affect firms’ diversification strategy making. This suggests a need to extend the literature 
on host country subnational institutional environments by considering the effect of home 
country subnational institutional environments. Drawing from the institution-based view, 
we suggest that the home country subnational institutional environment affects 
internationalization decision making from at least four perspectives.  
First, economic institutions generally involve the supply of intermediaries and 
infrastructures in product, labor, and capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna et 
al., 2005). Subnational regions in a country can differ markedly in the abundance level of 
economic institutions, with some regions suffering more from economic institutional voids, 
leading to location advantages of some regions over others in a country (Kambhampati & 
McCann, 2007; Ma et al., 2013; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). With well-established economic 
institutions in a region, it is easier for entrepreneurial firms to gain access to reliable 
information on consumers, product quality and features, creditors and investors, and 
quality of talent from regional markets (Khanna et al., 2005). Well-established information 
systems help reduce information asymmetries, thus lowering the cost of searching for 
information needed for internationalization (Lu, Xu, & Liu, 2009). Such institutions also 
allow entrepreneurial firms to gain access to various local resources that support their 
internationalization, such as financial capital and talent, with lower cost and less 
uncertainty. Moreover, efficient dissemination of product information enables 
entrepreneurial firms to establish credible brand names at lower cost (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997; Khanna et al., 2005), which in turn facilitates their internationalization.  
The second effect is government policy at the subnational level, with a focus on formal 
rules and the effectiveness and credibility of a region’s power center, which regulates 
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business transactions (Ma et al., 2013; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). In the emerging economy 
of China, several provincial and municipal governments, following the decentralization of 
the economic system in 1984, have played an important role in pushing many local firms 
into overseas investment activities, to obtain capital, technology, taxation income, and trade 
support for their respective local and regional development strategies (Cai, 1999; Luo, Xue, 
& Han, 2010). Consequently, subnational regions in emerging economies exhibit 
significant heterogeneity in the development of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
policies, with some economically developed regions launching such policies more 
successfully than others. Chinese firms from these subnational regions are encouraged to 
expand overseas because, with the local government’s political (and in some cases, 
financial) support, they can gather information on foreign business opportunities and 
market conditions and raise money quickly from local creditors.  
Third, subnational regions in emerging economies are likely to be heterogeneous in 
agglomeration of foreign MNCs (Ma et al., 2013; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Zhou et al., 
2002). For example, Meyer and Nguyen (2005) find that foreign investors are more likely 
to invest in subnational regions with more developed market-supporting institutions. In 
these regions, intense competition among foreign MNCs may drive domestic 
entrepreneurial firms to seek opportunities abroad to avoid clashing with firms in their 
home market (Dawar & Frost, 1999; Mascarenhas, 1986). The entry of foreign MNCs in a 
region also has spillover effects on domestic firms (Blake, Deng, & Rod, 2009; Wei & Liu, 
2006). Consistent with the learning advantage of newness, emerging market-based 
entrepreneurial firms could learn new and advanced knowledge and practice from foreign 
MNCs to compensate for their competitive disadvantages in international markets (Blake 
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et al., 2009; Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998; Nicolini & Resmini, 2010; Wei & Liu, 2006). 
Therefore, entrepreneurial firms based in well-regulated subnational regions may have 
more opportunities to gain access to resources and knowledge required for competing in 
international markets and thus have higher levels of internationalization. 
Fourth, regional social institutions, which generally involve the informal values and 
norms in the region, constrain the choice of action and facilitate acceptable and preferred 
behavior by members of a society (Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 2008; Gong et al., 2011). 
Evidence indicates that some subnational regions in China are growing more defiant 
against bureaucratic control by the central government and exhibit more openness in social 
values toward going global and building related commercial and cultural international links 
(Sheng, 2007). Such open beliefs and values about going global in the region contribute to 
entrepreneurial firms’ capability building (Saxenian, 1994) and enhance their motivation 
to get involved in a higher level of international expansion (Yamakawa et al., 2008).   
In summary, regional economic, political, and social institutions form the institutional 
environment at the subnational level from which entrepreneurial firms can gain access to 
resources and knowledge related to internationalization. Thus, a well-developed 
subnational institutional environment may foster and facilitate internationalization 
activities. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1. The development of subnational institutions in the home country exerts 
a positive effect on emerging economy entrepreneurial firms' degree of 
internationalization. 
 
3.2. The moderating effects of political capital 
The previous argument implies that though our theoretical framework should hold for 
emerging economy entrepreneurial firms, some firms are more capable than others of 
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spotting, recognizing, and exploiting the opportunities in the subnational institutional 
environment. One potential dimension that can moderate the exploitation of institutional 
benefits is a firm’s political capital, which serves as a “helping hand” to better gain access 
to resources from the home country environment (Che & Qian, 1998; Jun & Girma, 2010).  
We differentiate two types of political capital because of their unique features: 
political capital with high and low levels of government. As a result of successive waves 
of decentralization in China, high-level (including the central and provincial-level) and 
low-level (including municipal-, county-, and township-level) governments show 
significant differences in size, responsibility, authority, and efficiency (Chan et al., 2010b; 
Chien, 2010; Higgins et al., 2009; Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Li et al., 2012; Meyer & Peng, 
2005; Pepinsky & Wihardja, 2011; Xu, 2011; Zhan, 2009). Accordingly, prior studies have 
found that business connections with high and low levels of government influence business 
activities differently (Che & Qian, 1998). Because of the difference in their characteristics, 
political capital with high- and low-level governments helps entrepreneurial firms exploit 
institutional advantages in different ways.  
Governments in some emerging economies, such as China, have long supported large 
and established firms, especially state-owned firms, over small firms (Voss, Buckley, & 
Cross, 2010; Yamakawa et al., 2008). As a result, direct help, such as financial aid and 
preferential treatment from the government, is rare for entrepreneurial firms. However, 
political capital with high-level governments could improve entrepreneurial firms’ 
capability of gaining resources from the home country environment by enhancing their 
legitimacy and credibility (Wu, 2011).  
As argued previously, entrepreneurial firms based in regions with well-developed 
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institutions have access to resources and knowledge required for competing in international 
markets, leading to a higher level of internationalization. Such access can also arise for 
entrepreneurial firms with a high level of political capital because of their better credibility 
and legitimacy (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). For example, investors tend to believe that 
politically connected entrepreneurial firms have a low bankruptcy risk, which makes it 
easier and cheaper for these firms to secure financial capital from well-developed capital 
markets (Chan, Dang, & Yan, 2012; Faccio et al., 2006; Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2009; Liu, 
Uchida, & Gao, 2012) and weather financial downturns (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & 
Xu, 2015).  
High legitimacy of entrepreneurial firms also leads to customer acceptance of their 
products and technologies (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Suchman, 1995; Wu, 2011), thus helping 
them establish their brand names, which in turn facilitates access to resources in a 
developed product market during internationalization. Furthermore, politically connected 
entrepreneurial firms are more attractive to experienced workers than non-connected firms 
because of their higher growth opportunities (Faccio, 2010; Faccio et al., 2006; Fan, Wong, 
& Zhang, 2007). Therefore, in well-established labor markets, entrepreneurial firms with 
political capital with high-level governments have better access to talent.  
In summary, political capital with high-level governments improves entrepreneurial 
firms’ capability of gaining access to resources from subnational institutional environments 
by enhancing their credibility and legitimacy. In turn, this capability strengthens the 
influence of subnational home country environments on internationalization. Thus:  
Hypothesis 2. Emerging economy entrepreneurial firms' political capital with high-
level governments positively moderates the relationship between the development of 
subnational institutions and firms' degree of internationalization. 
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As argued previously, firms’ exploitation of institutional benefits requires better 
knowledge of the institutional environment. That is, entrepreneurial firms must be able to 
search and evaluate the information on the subnational institutional environment. This 
knowledge search and transfer process could be enhanced by the deployment of political 
capital with a low-level government. Specifically, with the government decentralization in 
China, many decision-making responsibilities (e.g., local industrial policy) now fall to low-
level governments (Chien, 2010; Oi, 1995), and thus low-level governments tend to have 
more specific information about regional institutions. Connections with low-level 
governments may enhance entrepreneurial firms’ access to information on subnational 
institutions from at least three channels, thus facilitating their internationalization.  
First, firms with connections with low-level governments tend to receive more help 
in the knowledge search phase because low-level governments have better knowledge 
about regional institutional environment. For example, local government offices inform 
potential local investors about foreign business opportunities, market conditions, and legal 
and taxation issues (Voss et al., 2010). Local governments also help firms attain credible 
information about local environments, such as policy shifts and industry reforms. Moreover, 
in some emerging economies, such as China, firms may need government approval to go 
abroad. Entrepreneurial firms with local government connections might receive exclusive 
information about these government policies and administrative procedures (Frynas et al., 
2006; Li et al., 2012; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Wei, Hou, Wang, & Wang, 2011). Therefore, 
deployment of political capital with low-level governments can facilitate entrepreneurial 
firms’ information search about institutional environments.  
Second, compared with those in high-level government, officials in local governments 
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tend to be more enthusiastic and proactive in promoting OFDI by local firms because they 
can share in subsequent benefits, such as the regional “openness” ranking (the higher OFDI 
from the region, the higher is the global openness of the region), increased exportation 
fostered by OFDI, and taxation income sharing from expanded businesses (Higgins, Levy, 
& Young, 2006; Li et al., 2014; Luo et al., 2010; Vries, 2008); these factors all directly 
influence the well-being and promotion of officials in local governments. As a result, local 
officials are motivated to turn the administrative bureaucracy (of which they are a part) 
into a free-flowing information channel to facilitate the expansion of local entrepreneurial 
firms. For example, using information and contacts they have developed through routine 
administrative work, local officials can provide information on new products, technology, 
and markets to connected firms (Oi, 1995), which in turn deepens these firms’ 
understanding of the development of product markets and facilitates their 
internationalization.  
Third, local governments in emerging markets, which, as we argued previously, have 
a better understanding of regional product market, also actively attempt to help politically 
connected entrepreneurial firms develop cooperation with relevant business associations 
and other agencies in the region (Voss et al., 2010), which leads to knowledge transfer from 
these agencies to the firms. As a result, political capital with low-level governments may 
improve entrepreneurial firms’ knowledge about the institutional environment, leading to 
better exploitation of subnational institutions. Thus:  
Hypothesis 3. Emerging economy entrepreneurial firms' political capital with low-
level governments positively moderates the relationship between the development of 
subnational institutions and firms' degree of internationalization. 
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Research site 
 China enjoyed an average annual increase of 22.4% in exports, from 2000, when 
the country joined the World Trade Organization, to 2010, in the process of becoming the 
world’s largest exporter with nearly 10% of the world’s total exports (UNCTAD, 2010). As 
the largest emerging economy, China has been transforming from a centrally planned to a 
market-based economy through liberalization and privatization since the late 1970s, 
accompanied by institutional upheaval in the political systems, legal framework, and 
market structure (Child & Tse, 2001). Private firms, as part of China’s vigorous economic 
engine, play an important role in facilitating economic development and expanding into 
international markets (Ahlstrom & Ding, 2014). However, private firms still face high 
pressure to gain social legitimacy and support (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Li, Meng, Wang, & 
Zhou, 2008). Without direct financial assistance from the government, private firms in 
China face severe market competition and institutional turbulence. Therefore, private firms 
have only recently gained the right to launch international activities directly, and with the 
unevenly developed subnational institutions, they offer a suitable natural context for testing 
the theoretical arguments we proposed (Hitt et al., 2004; Ma, Lin, & Liang, 2011).  
More specifically, individual firms are nested within provinces/cities, each of which 
embraces different subnational institutions, creating a hierarchical data structure with two 
levels of random variations: variation among individual firms (level 1) and variation among 
provinces/cities (level 2). To date, institution and internationalization literature has 
predominantly used ordinary least squares regression to examine the interaction between 
firm characteristics and environmental (i.e., home and host county) factors. However, this 
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approach does not take into consideration the interdependence of lower-level entities 
nested within higher-level units (Joshi, Liao, & Jackson, 2006). To avoid this problem, we 
used multi-level modeling, which is particularly suitable for analyzing data at different 
levels of analysis and accounts for the nesting of data at one level within another level (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).  
This study tests the effect of higher-level (level 2 or the subnational level) institutions 
on lower-level (level 1 or the firm level) emerging market entrepreneurial firms’ foreign 
sales intensity and the cross-level interactions between subnational institutions (level 2) 
and firms' managerial political capital (level 1). We also include control variables to 
eliminate confounding effects. The present design and analysis improve on existing studies 
that use multi-level analysis to provide a clearer picture of the dynamic interaction system 
of the internal and external influence of firm internationalization.  
4.2. Data 
 We used valid data from several reliable sources. The firm-level data came from 
the Biennial Survey of China’s Private Enterprises conducted from 2002 to 2006. This is a 
nationwide survey using a multi-stage stratified random sampling method to achieve a 
balanced representative sample of firms across all regions and industries in China, 
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, All China Industry and Commerce 
Federation, and the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. The survey data contain a sample of Chinese private firms in 14 
industries located in 31 regions (i.e., 22 provinces, four province-level municipalities, and 
five minority autonomous regions). This broad range of local institutional settings allows 
us to investigate how institutional heterogeneity influences Chinese enterprises across 
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provinces. The survey data set is by far the best for examining the effect of subnational 
institutions on Chinese firms’ internationalization, with intensive interviews of 
entrepreneurs and comprehensive questions about entrepreneurs’ backgrounds, family 
condition, firm history, size, basic financial information, and so on. After eliminating 
missing data and matching data for different years, we compiled a data set of 1,133 
observations.  
4.3. Measures 
4.3.1. Dependent variable  
Our aim is to investigate firms’ internationalization strategies. Therefore, the key 
variable of interest is foreign sales intensity, measured as foreign sales divided by total 
sales, with a two-year lag. We used logit transformation on the foreign sales percentage—
y' = ln(y/[1 – y]).  
4.3.2. Explanatory variables 
At the subnational level, we measured subnational institutions using the Index of 
Marketization, which was developed by the National Economic Research Institute of the 
State Council. The index was computed on the basis of data from Chinese statistical 
yearbooks, reports from the administrations of industry and commerce, and surveys. The 
index measures the quality of market-supporting institutions at the provincial level and 
captures the progress of transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economy.  
At the individual level are two explanatory variables: political capital with high- and low-
level governments. Entrepreneurs’ political capital reveals their connection with political 
authorities and the resources to which they gain access (Li & Zhang, 2007; Park & Luo, 
2001); we measured it as the combination of entrepreneurs’ membership in People's 
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Congress (PC) and People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at different levels. 
We measured political capital with high-level governments as the sum of PC and CPPCC 
memberships at the provincial and national levels. We assessed political capital with low-
level governments as the sum of PC and CPPCC memberships at municipal, county, and 
township levels. As mentioned previously, we adopt multi-level regressions to examine 
both the effect of the subnational institution and firms’ political capital. Especially for 
testing the effect of political capital, we relied on regression with dummy variables. 
Drawing from previous research, we defined the dummy variables as D1 equals 1 if a firm 
has political capital with high-level governments (and 0 otherwise) and D2 equals 1 if a 
firm has political capital with a low-level government (and 0 otherwise). 
4.3.3. Control variables 
To account for potential confounding at both the subnational and firm levels, we 
controlled for several variables that might be associated with a firm’s foreign strategy. 
Specifically, we incorporated several firm-specific factors to tease apart their effects on 
firm foreign sales intensity. We measured Firm size with the natural log of the employee 
number and Firm age as the years from the firm's business registration in the survey year. 
We also determined whether the firm had been restructured from a state-owned enterprise 
to a private firm and labeled this variable as Restructure. For financial equity, we controlled 
for Debt equity ratio, and for firm performance, Return on equity. Because foreign 
ownership might influence firms' international strategies and foreign sales, we also 
controlled for Foreign equity ratio. We measured firms' technology capability as their R&D 
expenditure (Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & McCullough, 2007), as technology capability 
can foster internationalization (Monreal-Pérez, Aragón-Sánchez, & Sánchez-Marín, 2012). 
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We also controlled for entrepreneurs' Age and Education to eliminate their potential 
confounding effects.  
At the subnational level, we controlled for the population of the subnational region by 
using the natural log of the population size (LnPopulation). We controlled for Education 
by using the proportion of the number of people with an education (above primary school) 
to the total number of adults (older than 6 years of age). To control for the economic 
development of each subnational region, we added the variable on whether the region is 
located in the Special economic zone to the model. Finally, we added Patent ratio to the 
model to control for the potential effect of subnational innovation, by using the ratio of 
patent granted to total patent applications for each year. 
 
5. Results 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics and correlation matrix. We checked for the 
possibility of collinearity among the independent variables by running a variance inflation 
matrix analysis. The variance inflation factor indices are all below 3, which is much lower 
than the accepted value of 10 to indicate problems of collinearity (Stata Corporation, 2001).  
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
We used the longitudinal multi-level mixed-effect model to analyze the data. The 
longitudinal/panel data method allows us to control for individual heterogeneity. To 
eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results, we controlled for firm-specific heterogeneity 
by modeling it as an individual effect, which is eliminated when taking the first differences 
of the variables. We also controlled for year dummy variables, by eliminating time-specific 
effects, and for industry dummies, representing industry-specific effects.  
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Table 2 shows the multi-level regression results. We estimated nested models by 
starting with a barebones model and successively adding variables of interest, specifically 
the interaction variables. First, we included all the control variables in a basic model 
(Model 1). Firm size is significantly related to the degree of internationalization (γ = 0.346, 
p < 0.001). Manufacturing firms are also more likely to have higher foreign sales (γ = 0.820, 
p < 0.001). Second, we added the independent variable, development of subnational 
institutions, to Model 2. The results show that subnational institutions have a positive 
relationship to firms’ degree of internationalization (γ = 0.388, p < 0.05), providing strong 
support for Hypothesis 1.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict the moderating effect of political capital on the degree of 
internationalization. As Model 3 shows, the moderation of political capital with high-level 
governments on the relationship between subnational institutions and the degree of 
internationalization is not significant, offering no support to Hypothesis 2. Model 4 shows 
that the moderation of political capital with low-level governments is significantly positive 
(γ = 0.193, p < 0.05), in support of Hypothesis 3. In Model 5 (the full model), which 
includes all the variables and interactions, the results confirm support for Hypotheses 2 and 
3. Fig. 1 illustrates the moderation effect of political capital with low-level governments 
on the relationship between the development of subnational institutions and the degree of 
internationalization.  
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
 
6. Discussion 
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This article shows how subnational institutions in the home country can benefit 
emerging market entrepreneurial firms’ international expansion and how such benefits vary 
across firms with different types of political capital. By and large, our results from a sample 
of 760 entrepreneurial firms in China over five years corroborate the central proposition of 
this study—well-established subnational institutions in a home country facilitate 
entrepreneurial firms' internationalization, and political capital is important for linking the 
home market institutional environment and firms’ decisions to expand internationally. 
We found that entrepreneurial firms’ degree of internationalization is positively 
related to the level of the regional institutional environment in emerging markets. This 
evidence complements previous research findings that emerging market–based 
entrepreneurial firms expand overseas to overcome the institutional disadvantages in their 
home country (Yamakawa et al., 2008). The significant, positive effect of regional 
institution development on international market expansion also provides strong support for 
the importance of subnational regions as an additional unit in explaining entrepreneurial 
firms’ internationalization strategies.  
This study also argued that the exploitation benefits of home country institutional 
environments depend on the type of political capital with home governments. We argued 
that because of the different characteristics of high- and low-level governments, political 
capital with different types of governments plays different roles in entrepreneurial firms’ 
exploitation of institutional benefits. Political capital with high-level governments 
enhances entrepreneurial firms’ capability of utilizing the institutions, mainly by enhancing 
firms’ creditability and legitimacy; political capital with low-level governments improves 
entrepreneurial firms’ understanding of the institutional environment, largely by 
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facilitating knowledge search and transfer. As a result, we proposed that both types of 
political capital improve entrepreneurial firms’ capability of exploiting institutional 
benefits and thus positively moderate the relationship between regional institutional 
environmental development and firms’ degree of internationalization. 
6.1. Theoretical contributions 
This study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, the study 
extends prior research by teasing out how macro-level institutional development and firm’s 
micro-level resource-seeking strategies interact to enhance firms’ international expansion. 
Prior research on the home country environment–international expansion relationship has 
emphasized the power of institutions to determine firms’ international investment behavior 
(Voss et al., 2010; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). These studies have explicitly argued that firms 
benefit equally from home country institutional environments during internationalization 
and thus have largely ignored the difference in benefits firms receive from their 
heterogeneous strategies to exploit the institutions.  
Our study was motivated by such a dearth of multi-level studies on the institutional 
environment–internationalization link. In particular, we argued that benefiting from the 
institutional environment involves a process of exploiting the institutional advantages. This 
process is difficult because it requires that firms have a wide range of knowledge of 
institutions and the capability of utilizing these institutions. Thus, how well firms can 
exploit the benefits of their home country institutional environments during 
internationalization depends not only on the level of institutional development in the 
environments but also on the strategies firms use to exploit the benefits.  
In our study, we did not treat firms as passive recipients of benefits of well-established 
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institutions, but rather recognized the potential of deploying political capital to enhance 
entrepreneurial firms’ alignment with their home environments, which is an important 
mechanism to enhance firms’ capability of utilizing and exploiting institutional benefits in 
emerging markets. This finding means that embedment within well-developed home 
country institutional environments is necessary but not sufficient in itself for 
entrepreneurial firms’ to attain specific advantages for international expansion. 
Consideration of entrepreneurial firms’ political capital deployment as a mechanism to 
facilitate exploitation of home country institutional advantages is important to theory 
development because it extends conceptions of how institutional environments can 
influence a range of firm activities from governance to strategy (Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & 
Stevens, 2015; Liu, Wang, Zhao, & Ahlstrom, 2013) and outcomes such as financial and 
market performance (Jiang, Peng, Yang, & Mutlu, 2015; McGuinness, Lam, & Vieito, 
2015).  
Second, we introduced theoretical insights from the political capital literature to the 
home country institutional environment and internationalization literature streams. Rather 
than replicating prior findings in new empirical settings, however, we adapted a political 
economics perspective to suggest a fresh approach to investigating emerging market–based 
entrepreneurial firms’ internationalization strategies—that is, an approach that emphasizes 
the significance of political capital in linking home country institutional environments and 
firm strategies.  
This study also makes an important contribution to literature on political capital by 
extending the influence of political capital on firms’ strategic decisions from the domestic 
market to the international market. In this sense, the integrative views developed in this 
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study can be important stepping stones for future theory development in both the political 
capital and the home country institutional environment literature streams. 
Third, this study challenges the premise in prior management research that all types 
of political capital are equally effective in affecting a firm’s strategy making. To emphasize 
how the power of different types of political capital varies, we differentiated political 
capital with two levels of home country governments. We then illustrated how these two 
types of political capital vary in their roles in developing entrepreneurial firms’ capabilities 
of exploiting institutional advantages. In particular, we simultaneously considered the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of institutional conditions in emerging economies and the 
heterogeneity of entrepreneurial firms’ political capital with high- and low-level 
governments, respectively.  
Moreover, in general conventional international business research explores the 
influence of between-home-country environmental differences on firms’ international 
expansion and performance (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Yamakawa et al., 2008), while 
largely ignoring the effects of within-country differences on firms’ strategy making. Our 
findings reveal that entrepreneurial firms’ international expansion is greatly dependent on 
the subnational environment. Thus, we answer Ahlstrom et al.’s (2014) call to develop a 
more robust assessment of firms’ international market expansion level. 
Finally, we changed the focus of international entrepreneurial literature from 
knowledge and asset acquisition in the host country to knowledge and asset acquisition in 
the home country (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000; McDougall & Oviatt, 1996; Zahra, 
Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). The traditional focus explains how entrepreneurial firms overcome 
financial and managerial resource deficiencies and disadvantages due to limited business 
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experience from a host country perspective (Lu, Zhou, Garry, & Li, 2010; Wei et al., 2011). 
Our study provides a new perspective by emphasizing asset and knowledge acquisition 
from the home country, especially the subnational institutional environments in the home 
country. 
6.2. Managerial implications 
This study also offers important managerial implications for managers of 
entrepreneurial firms in emerging markets who are considering entering international 
markets. Our findings suggest that both the regional institutional environment and firms’ 
resource-seeking strategies are important considerations when making internationalization 
decisions. Moreover, for entrepreneurial firms in well-developed regional institutional 
environments, managers should not neglect developing political capital with regional and 
local governments rather than focusing only on the central government (Ahlstrom et al., 
2003; Mann, 1997).  
This is true because the former type of political capital directly improves firms’ 
capability of exploiting institutional advantages and navigating the environment while 
facilitating innovation (Ahlstrom, 2010; Su, Peng, & Xie, 2016). The Shanghai government, 
for example, is well-known for providing fast approval for entrepreneurs and new investors 
while providing good protection for property rights. This is also the case for other business-
friendly local governments, such as Dongguan city and counties in China’s southern 
Guangdong province. In addition to helping firms get started and build legitimacy and 
social capital, political capital also helps them avoid the many pitfalls associated with weak 
formal institutions at the central level of government so common in emerging economies 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Clissold, 2006). 
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6.3. Limitations and further research 
Several promising directions are available for future studies. First, firms face three 
related questions with regard to international expansion: what market to enter (entry 
location), how to enter (mode of entry), and when to enter (timing of entry) (Gaba, Pan, & 
Ungson, 2002). Further research could examine how the home market institutional 
environment and firms’ political capital influence these decisions.  
Second, although China represents a good example of an emerging economy, future 
studies could examine whether our results hold for entrepreneurial firms from other 
emerging and newly developed economies. For example, studies could also test the 
hypotheses with a multiple-country sample and compare whether the integrative influence 
of the institutional environment and political capital varies across countries.  
Third, further research could use other measurements to gauge the level of 
international expansion to examine the robustness of our results (Abrahamson, 2008). 
Proxies of the degree of foreign investment used in previous studies include foreign sales 
to total sales (Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989), foreign assets to total assets (Daniels 
& Bracker, 1989), and geographic dispersion (similar to the measures used herein) (Lu & 
Beamish, 2004). These measurements have varying implications; the first two measures 
gauge a firm’s dependence on foreign markets and foreign resources, respectively (Sanders 
& Carpenter, 1998), while the third measure is a proxy for the cultural and institutional 
variety an MNC encounters (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study advances the institutional view of internationalization by aligning the 
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subnational institutional environment with resource-seeking considerations. Using a large 
sample of Chinese entrepreneurial firms from 2002 to 2006, we found that a well-
established subnational institutional environment led to a higher degree of 
internationalization. Companies operating in emerging economics need to pay attention to 
the local institutional environment, not only at the national level but also at the subnational 
level. Furthermore, we argued that political capital with low-level and regional 
governments contributes to emerging market–based entrepreneurial firms’ capability of 
exploiting institutional benefits by facilitating information search and transfer. Conversely, 
political capital with high-level (central and top provincial) governments enhances firms’ 
institutional benefit exploitation largely by increasing their credibility and legitimacy. Both 
types of political capital positively moderate the relationship between the subnational 
institutional environment and entrepreneurial firms’ degree of internationalization. Our 
study sheds more light on how different levels of political capital can more specifically 
shape entrepreneurial firms’ capability of benefiting from home country subnational 
institutional environments in internationalization and related strategies.  
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Table 1 
Statistics and correlation matrix of variables. a 
 
a 1,133 observation in 64 groups. 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Firm size 4.177 1.270              
2 Year 18.220 29.583 0.031             
3 Debt ratio 1.129 4.114 0.106 -0.000            
4 Return on equity 0.432 0.667 0.057 0.049 0.008           
5 Foreign equity 0.567 5.943 0.052 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014          
6 R&D 0.098 0.276 0.010 0.093 0.050 0.041 -0.025         
7 Restructure  0.159 0.366 0.073 -0.079 -0.016 -0.023 0.005 -0.018        
8 Industry-Manuf 0.453 0.498 0.204 -0.036 0.042 0.044 0.057 0.008 0.053       
9 Industry-Tech 0.012 0.110 -0.021 0.018 0.000 0.038 -0.011 0.059 -0.027 -0.101      
11 Age 50.531 58.646 -0.066 0.006 -0.004 0.013 -0.004 0.046 0.002 0.037 -0.005     
12 Education 3.408 1.164 0.103 -0.101 -0.004 0.010 0.015 0.009 -0.008 -0.045 0.084 -0.081    
13 Political capital with a 
high-level government 
0.023 0.156 0.175 0.004 0.058 0.023 0.032 0.041 0.029 0.025 -0.016 0.004 0.036   
14 Political capital with a 
low-level government 
0.729 0.649 0.258 -0.009 0.039 -0.011 0.012 -0.021 0.055 0.004 0.009 -0.033 0.065 -0.078  
15 Degree of 
internationalization 
0.024 0.123 0.067 -0.042 0.019 -0.036 0.046 -0.019 0,016 0.097 -0.022 -0.006 0.024 0.027 0.030 
  M SD 1 2 3 4          
1 Subnational institution 0.568 1.962              
2 LnPopulation 8.407 0.655 0.034             
3 Patent ratio 1.879 0.413 0.333 -0.252            
4 Regional education 0.879 0.041 0.228 0.121 0.178           
5 Special economic zone 1.129 0.560 0.159 0.104 -0.200 0.099          
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Table 2 
Regression results for emerging market firms' foreign sales intensity. a 
 
 
a1,133 observation in 64 groups. 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Two-tailed tests. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Subnational institution  0.388(0.122)*** 0.389(0.122)*** 0.374(0.125)** 0.376(0.126)** 
Subnational institution 
× Political capital with a 
high-level government 
  0.024(0.112)  0.041(0.112) 
Subnational institution 
× Political capital with a 
low-level government 
   0.193(0.089)* 0.196(0.090)* 
Political capital with a 
high-level government 
-0.067(0.091) -0.079(0.090) -0.080(0.090) -0.077(0.090) -0.078(0.090) 
Political capital with a 
low-level government 
0.166(0.095)† 0.161(0.095)† 0.162(0.095)† 0.184(0.095)† 0.184(0.095)† 
LnPopulation -0.205(0.215) -0.087(0.156) -0.087(0.156) -0.096(0.161) -0.095(0.161) 
Patent ratio -0.011(0.127) -0.105(0.129) -0.106(0.129) -0.089(0.130) -0.091(0.130) 
Education -0.203(0.215) -0.429(0.204)* -0.429(0.204)* -0.411(0.206)* -0.409(0.206)* 
Special economic zone -0.079(0.143) -0.176(0.111) -0.177(0.111) -0.183(0.114) -0.184(0.114) 
Firm size 0.346(0.098)*** 0.338(0.097)*** 0.337(0.097)*** 0.337(0.097)*** 0.334(0.097)*** 
Year -0.079(0.089) -0.081(0.089) -0.080(0.089) -0.080(0.089) -0.079(0.089) 
Debt/equity ratio 0.033(0.088) 0.037(0.088) 0.037(0.088) 0.041(0.088) 0.040(0.088) 
Return on equity -0.159(0.080)* -0.157(0.080)* -0.157(0.080)* -0.155(0.078)* -0.154(0.079)* 
Foreign equity 0.039(0.088) 0.039(0.089) 0.038(0.089) 0.034(0.088) 0.033(0.088) 
R&D -0.049(0.089) -0.042(0.089) -0.042(0.089) -0.033(0.088) -0.033(0.089) 
Restructure  0.031(0.243) 0.050(0.242) 0.052(0.242) 0.044(0.241) 0.048(0.241) 
Industry-Manuf 0.820(0.185)*** 0.798(0.184)*** 0.797(0.184)*** 0.799(0.184)*** 0.799(0.184)*** 
Industry-Tech -0.679(0.801) -0.655(0.802) -0.655(0.802) -0.690(0.800) -0.691(0.800) 
Age 0.009(0.087) 0.002(0.088) -0.002(0.090) -0.006(0.090) -0.006(0.087) 
Regional education 0.136(0.090) 0.129(0.090) 0.129(0.090) 0.143(0.090) 0.145(0.090) 
Intercept -11.067(0.185)*** -10.965(0.158)*** -10.966(0.158)*** -10.938(0.162)*** -10.939(0.162)*** 
      
Log-likelihood -2831.1903 -2828.9542 -2828.9542 -2826.6545 -2826.5885 
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Fig. 1. The moderation effect of political capital with low-level governments on the relationship 
between the development of subnational institutions and degree of Internationalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
